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Abstract 
 Many scholars have pondered over the equation of the MENA region 
(Middle East and North Africa) and its “exceptionality” without being able 
to reach a satisfactory answer to it: what makes this region so “resilient” to 
change, particularly given the rapid expansion of freedom elsewhere in the 
world. The Arab uprising of 2011 or what is known worldwide as the “Arab 
Spring” was deemed to be the harbinger of the end of the 
“curse/exceptionality,” the curse of this seemingly permanent state of 
underdevelopment, corruption, and dictatorship. But then that Arab spring 
itself has turned out to be rather an Arab “winter,” further vindicating the 
above prejudice, and pushing a lot of yesterday’s enthusiastic crowds to be 
disappointed and to curse the day they thought about overthrowing their 
“beloved” dictators. 
Drawing on other experiences elsewhere (mainly the spring of the European 
peoples in 1848 and the Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989), this essay attempts 
humbly to participate in this debate and to offer, on the one hand, certain 
relativity both to the enthusiasm and disappointment that have accompanied 
respectively the Arab uprising. On the other hand, and besides reviewing the 
prolific literature that has been written about the possible causes of the 
upheaval, offers “tentative” notes that aim to participate in the general debate 
with no pretention of offering a comprehensive analysis to a movement 
whose ins and outs are still “blowing in the wind”. 
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« Quand une fois la liberté a explosé dans une âme d’homme, 
les dieux ne peuvent plus rien contre cet homme-là » 
 (Jean-Paul Sartre, Les Mouches) 
 
“Uprisings have a body with which one can engage in 
combat. Revolutions, on the other hand, have a lot in 
common with ghosts.”  
(Metternich to Guizot, 31 October, 1847) 




 Different readings have been made of what is now known as the Arab 
Spring, chronologically a misnomer since the events in Tunisia and Egypt 
started in winter, and retrospectively an inappropriate label since the leading 
countries that experimented it turned all, with a slight exception of Tunisia, 
to be failing states and for the population worse economic conditions. The 
label was, nonetheless and understandably at the time, an optimistic  
metaphoric label in the tradition of other historic events that brought 
prosperity and peace to other regions in the world. 
 Before this major event, however, there have been numerous attempts 
at deciphering the MENA region’s “resilience and exceptionality” to the 
winds of change and democracy, particularly given the rapid expansion of 
freedom elsewhere in the world. A lot of Orientalists and analysts related it 
to the nature of the Arab psyche and the religious framework in which it 
grew59. Though some of these readings/analyses have solid arguments for 




 Michael Zantovsky, in an article titled : “1989 and 2011: Compare 
and Contrast,” written during the beginning of the Arab uprising, starts his 
essay by explaining the origins of the label given to the movement and 
argues that though it started in the winter of 2011, the “Arab Winter” as a 
label for the movement at that time would not do. He explains then that the 
Arab Spring: 
borrowed from a European coinage, first employed as "the 
Spring of Nations" in reference to the revolutions and revolts 
                                                          
59
 A framework the orientalists and secularists think is reminiscent of the dominance of the 
Catholic church over the vastly illiterate European population during the middle ages, a 
population which managed to get back into “History” only when it managed to liberate itself 
from the shackles of servitude and ignorance imposed on it by this church.  At that very 
moment, though, and in different intellectual Arab capitals in the Middle East (Damascus, 
Baghdad, Cairo, Fez,…) there were the first seeds of a booming intellectual movement. 
Indeed, the insightful debates Muslims had right after the death of the prophet over which 
should prevail: “the mind or the text/tradition,” and which resulted in the formation of 
intellectual groups (such as al Ach’arit and the Muatazilit schools) attest to the healthy 
development of Muslim society and the flourishing of Arab thought and philosophy. Alas 
that development started to decline with the European Renaissance, vindicating the 
Khaldunian (Aderrahman Ibn Khaldun) theory of the wheel of civilization. A long sleep 
ensued for centuries… That Arab healthy debate came fortunately alive again during the 
Arab “nahda”/ renaissance at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th Century with 
major intellectual figures such as Rifa'a Rafi' El-Tahtawi,  Jamal Eddine Al Afghani, 
Mohamed Abdou, and others. 
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across Europe of 1848, which brought to many parts of the 
continent the ideas of independence, self-government, and 
participatory rule. The other well-known use is that of the 
Prague Spring of 1968, which meant a breath of fresh air from 
the long Communist winter. (Zantovsky, 2011, p. 14) 
 He then refutes the parallel that a lot of people hastened to draw 
between the events of 1989 —the fall of the Berlin Wall, which was never 
referred to as a spring, and brought down the whole totalitarian communist 
block—on the one hand, and the events of 2011 in the Arab world on the 
other hand, perhaps because, as he said, “then there was a complete seasonal 
change.” (Zantovsky, 2011) 
 The French historian Alain Garrigou, in an article in Le monde 
diplomatique entitled “1948, le printemps des peuples,” draws also an 
interesting parallel between what is going on in the Arab world and what 
happened in 1848 in Europe. He details how Europe’s “spring” started with a 
“simple” incident at the gates of the French monarchy’s palace in Paris, and 
how the French prime minister at the time ordered the royal guard to fire 
against the insurgents. This ended with the insurgents radicalizing their 
movement and ultimately propagating it to the rest of Europe. Some years 
later, and fearing the repercussions of the movement on their own existence, 
the European monarchies united in a counter-revolutionary movement that 
crashed the European “spring.”60  
 Likewise, and in an article entitled “The Arab Revolutions of 2011 
Are more Like Europe in 1848 not 1989,” Anne Applebaum argues that the 
Arab uprisings of 2011 are reminiscent of the European revolutions of 
1848—complicated and messy. She drew parallels between what happened 
in Tunis, Cairo, Bengazi and what happened in Prague and Berlin two 
decades before. But like Michael Zantovsky above, she asserts that there is a 
major difference between the street revolutions that ended communism in 
Europe and the Arab uprising. The Eastern European revolt had a similar 
pattern because it followed in the wake of one single political event, the 
abrupt withdrawal of Soviet support for the local dictators. Whereas the Arab 
uprisings were the product of multiple changes: economic, technological, 
and demographic. In that sense, they have a lot more in common with 1848 
than with 1989.  
 Applebaum concludes that though inspired very generally by the 
ideas of liberal nationalism and democracy, the mostly middle-class 
demonstrators of 1848 had, like their Arab counterparts, very different goals 
in different countries. For example, in Hungary they demanded 
                                                          
60
 This reminds us of what happened in 2011 when a lot of Gulf monarchies (Bahrein, UAE, 
Saoudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Sultanate of Oman) united against the insurgents in their 
respective countries and in the region as a whole. 
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independence from Hapsburg Austria. In what is now Germany, they aimed 
to unify the German-speaking people into a single state. In France, they 
wanted to overthrow the monarchy. (Applebaum, 2011)  
  
Roots and causes 
 As for the causes of the Arab uprising, a lot has already been said and 
many political analysts divide the causes of the Arab spring into two 
categories: the long term root causes leading to the uprisings, and other 
“spontaneous and direct factors” which triggered the sudden, on the spot 
organization of protest: 
Long-term, embedded structural factors leading to the 
Arab Spring comprise corruption, State repression, 
denial of political freedoms, the failure of the 
traditional powers to accommodate and recognize new 
youth movements, the development of gaps between 
the various regions inside one country, the domination 
of economic resources by the few through the alliance 
of State authority and the capital of powerful private 
individuals, and the spread of poverty and 
unemployment among massive swathes of the 
population…. On the other hand, the spontaneous 
factors which acted as catalysts sparking the uprisings 
on the spot were Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-
immolation in Tunisia, the torture of Khaled Said in 
Egypt, and the arrest of the political activist, Fathi 
Terbel in Libya. According to current consensus 
among political analysts, the mix of the long term 
structural factors listed above set ablaze by the 
spontaneous sparks arising in Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Libya to create the waves of outrage which fueled the 
Arab uprisings. (Osman Saleh, 2013, p. 188) 
  
 The author of the quote above, Kamal Eldin Osman Saleh, then went 
on to denounce the oversimplification of certain western intellectuals, among 
whom the famous New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman who, in an 
article entitled “It Is Just the Beginning” argued intriguingly that the election 
of the first black president of the United States, Barack Obama, and the 
resignation of the former Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, on allegations 
of corruption, are also among the major factors that led to the popular 
uprisings in the Arab world. (Osman Saleh, 2013)61 
                                                          
61
 Sometimes, the purpose behind these “original” analyses, according to the author, is to 
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 Other analysts and observers offered the NICTs (New Information 
and Communication Technologies) as the major instigator and mobilizer for 
the Arab revolt, calling it in the process: revolution 2.0 or Facebook 
revolution. Though there is no denial that technology did help in the ignition 
of and the mobilization for this leaderless movement, some observers, on the 
one hand, put into question the extent of this involvement, denying the Arab 
youth the privilege to be the first generation in the world to use massively the 
digital technology as a major means of “revolution.” Others like the Egypto-
Suiss intellectual Tarek Ramadan, on the other hand, saw in people like the 
famous young Egyptian computer expert and activitst, Wael Ghonim, and the 
like, a kind of “Troyan horse” of Western powers…(Ramadan, 2012)62 
 Olivier Roy in an essay  in Le Monde newspaper titled “Révolution 
Post-islamiste,” distinguishes clearly between the Arab generations of the 
70s and 80s on the one hand, and their children who led the revolt in 2011, 
on the other. He cites the example of the Muslim brothers in Egypt who had 
a huge influence on the population and which had pushed the Egyptian 
president Husni Mubarak to compose with them. (Roy, 2011). We all 
remember also the impact the FIS (Front Islamique du Salut) had in Algeria 
on the population and how they managed to legally and rightfully won the 
legislative elections in 1991, which the military cadres denied them, leading 
the country into civil war.  
 The generation of the Arab uprising, according to O. Roy, is “post-
Islamist,” still conservative indeed (more mosques, more women wearing the 
veil, and more Islamic signs), but a generation that understands, according to 
him, that religion can be practiced privately. (Roy, 2011) In other words,  
political Islam and its ideal to transform radically Muslim societies “à 
l’iranienne” was abandoned by the younger Arab generation in favor of more 
urgent needs of democracy, justice, a fair share of wealth, and mainly less 
corruption, a position shared by many pundits: 
In a radical departure from previous political generations, 
which were either nationalist or Islamist, the current protestors 
are thus seen as the standard-bearers of a cultural and 
intellectual revolution. These new men and women have 
allegedly forged “a new relationship to the self, a new 
relationship with others, with the world and in particular with 
                                                                                                                                                     
deprive the Arabs of their capacity to be masters of their own destiny, which implies that 
they are always in need of external “models” to be inspired… 
62
 The author does not go as far as considering this as part of a conspiracy to tumble Arab 
regimes, since he admits that these young people were simple activists trained by Western 
powers.  He does state, however, that the United States long before the start of the Arab 
upheavals had recruited and trained groups of Arab youth with the aim to implement 
“peaceful protest” within their respective countries. 
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the West”, as well as with political, religious and familial 
authorities. (Bennani-Chraïbi, Fillieule and  Raillard, 2012, p. 
10) 
 
Arab vs Amazigh, Modern vs Traditional: 
 So far, I have been discussing the issue of the “Arab spring” without 
tackling the complex problem related to the epithet/component “Arab” in it. 
This is a quite thorny question because a lot of people do not find themselves 
into the label “Arab spring/uprising/revolt,” and continue to think that as 
long as this issue of identity has not been resolved for this large part of the 
Maghrebi population, we cannot speak of any settlement or appeased outlook 
to the future. Every now and then, Amazigh dissidents organise huge protests 
as a reminder that six years after the first uprisings, nothing has been settled 
yet. 
 A lot of Amazigh and other “minorities”63 in the Arab world 
rightfully put the question: What made the world define the phenomenon that 
took place in this region as “Arab?” Is it a question of concomitant borders, 
but borders, as we all know, are artificial and were most of the time imposed 
by the former colonising western powers? There are nations without borders 
and borders without coherent nations.64 Or was the name due to the fact that 
a majority of the inhabitants of this region speak Arabic? 
 This polarisation does not end there. It goes, as demonstrated before, 
to questions of generation gap, modernity vs tradition or authenticity, 
extreme poverty vs extreme wealth, or nationalist vs Islamist. Morocco 
offers the archetypical illustration of these polarities. The bright side of the 
Arab uprising in this country was illustrated by the famous youth movement 
called “20 Fevrier.” The militants belonged to different factions that were in 
utter opposition to each other when it comes to their ideologies/identities, we 
had ultra-Marxist-Leninist groups as well as ultra-religious ones, all walking 
together in public marches and demonstrations, claiming a refusal of tyranny 
and injustice, but conspicuously contradictory about the ultimate society they 
aim to achieve. 
 This polarisation is reflected even in the intellectual circles that try to 
defend respectively the “chapel”/group they represent. Here is for example 
an interesting interview with Tariq Ramadan and Abdelwahab Meddeb in Le 
Monde newspaper entitled  “De la charia à l'islamophobie, de 
l'homosexualité au statut de la femme”, held in April 2011, and how each 
one of these two Arab intellectuals holds quite opposing positions as to what 
                                                          
63
 I put “minority” between inverted commas because the Amazigh in Morocco constitute a 
“majority.”  
64
 We think here of the Kurds, the Native Americans, the Amazigh, the former states of the 
USSR or of Yugoslavia.  
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defines the identities of the youngsters who protested in the “Arab Spring.” 
While Ramadan acknowledges that the movement is certainly not Islamist, 
he condemns those who claim it to be anti-Islamic. On the other hand, A. 
Meddeb openly, like Olivier Roy before, rejects any religious dimension of 
the movement and defines it rather as a humanist movement. He maintains 
that it is not post-Islamic but beyond Islam. 
 Notwithstanding these polarisations, observers note that if contained, 
they could simply be part of the normal course of any movement born in 
undemocratic environments with a predominance of the leader’s unique 
opinion and voice. That is why some analysts consider that in spite of these 
shortcomings, the movement is the Arab world’s exit into history, “an exit 
from a sterile closed place into a land of painful and consequential choices,” 
a shift from the status of subjects to the status of citizens.(Keane, 2011)65 
 Nobody knows what would happen next; this is the trademark of 
revolutions: “they unchain struggles for freedom and power manoeuvres that 
inject great uncertainty into the world.” (Keane, 2011) And as such, we 
should expect more “ups and downs,” but we should especially be very 
patient and extremely careful with hasty judgements or actions that could 
make things far worse. 
Tarek Ramadan insists that: 
“analysis in the heat of the action is never easy, especially as 
events unfold and their causes—and the future itself—remain 
clouded with uncertainty. .. As vital as it appears to give the 
Arab uprisings a name, we should be cautious about rushing 
to define them. Not knowing exactly what the components of 
these nonviolent, transnational mass movements are, we know 
even less about their eventual outcome.(Ramadan, 2012, p. 1) 
 
Satellite reception, Al Jazeera Channel, and the theory of conspiracy: 
 Besides the objective and spontaneous reasons and causes of the Arab 
uprising mentioned above, there are other reasons that should be mentioned, 
among which the role of satellite reception in general and the reception by 
the end of the 1990s of the Qatari Aljazeera TV channel, in particular.  
 Al Jazeera helped to mold “a new Arab public”, “to circumvent 
official demands and to promote unprecedented media pluralism granting 
space” to multiple opinions  (ar-ra’y wa ar-ra’y al-akhar) (Bennani-Chraïbi, 
                                                          
65
 This could be corroborated through the example of Israel, a very young state made of 
ultra-religious and ultra-liberal groups of different, and often very distant origins, but which 
still form one of the rare “democratic” countries in the region, at least from the perspective 
of the Western countries; since we Arab-Muslims consider it rather a racist and 
segregationist state in its dealing with the Arab-Israeli citizens. 
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Fillieule and  Raillard, 2012).66 I remember how we were mesmerized by the 
debate of the “al Ittijah Al mo’akiss (the opposite direction) program. The 
style of the debate was definitely new to the Arab world, especially for those 
who were not familiar with Western TV channels. We felt that it is high time 
for the Arab individual to triumph over sectarianism, or tribal allegiances. 
We felt for the first time that this Arab program was talking to us, evoking 
topics kept taboo for decades, with two guests who spoke their minds, and a 
TV anchor who heated the debate by provoking his guests into fiercer 
arguments. 
 As the late Fatima Mernissi remarked in an interview in 2006,  
The satellite channels have strengthened a pan-Arab space of 
reception that has become a unique transnational market. The 
old information networks characterized by a propaganda 
function have been replaced by others, with new professional 
guide-lines conforming to the international standards. In 
addition to the spreading of satellite dishes which tower even 
on the balconies of Casablanca over the shanty town. 
(Mernissi, 2006) 
 Mernissi also refers to the role of cyber cafes which started in the 80's 
and how they increased in number and represented the “new frontier” of 
communication in the Arab world. The enthusiasm manifested by Fatima 
Mernissi towards the spread of Internet and satellite televisions as means of 
democratization and expression was a precursor to the uprising that was 
going to take place a few years later. (Mernissi, 2006) 
 As for those orientalists or others who still find us “exceptional”, and 
though I am not a fervent supporter of the conspiracy theory, I have reasons 
to think, based on factual arguments, that the Arab movement was not 
completely spontaneous. The objective and circumstantial causes mentioned 
before remain facts that no one can deny, but as Tarek Ramadan states in his 
book, Islam and the Arab Awakening: 
The uprisings that swept the Arab world did not come from 
nowhere. As early as 2003, there had been talk of 
democratization in the MENA zone. It had, in fact, become 
then-president George W. Bush’s key argument for 
                                                          
66
 From outside, Al Jazeera had all the aspects of a professional and unbiased TV channel, 
but after investigations carried by other media who felt dwarfed by this new comer, 
revelations started to “pour in” and revealed that this channel is part of an American Israeli 
scheme to create the famous « creative chaos » in the Arab world. Though there is a lot of 
truth to this, it remains that this channel “reshaped” rather positively the Arab mind, at least 
until a certain period of time, before Qatar started blatantly to use the channel as a 
propaganda medium to implement its political agenda. In all cases, if the channel were 
conceived as a mere propaganda tool for any party, it turned out into a Frankenstein that 
escaped the leash… 
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intervention in Iraq. One year later, young MENA cyber-
dissidents were signing up for training courses in nonviolent 
protest. Institutions funded by the American administration 
and/or major private firms organized lectures and seminars 
and set up networks that would provide training for young 
leaders who were given instruction in the use of the Internet 
and social networks…These are facts that just won’t go away; 
they must be studied and put in context if we wish to gain a 
better understanding of the dynamics and issues involved. 
(Ramadan, 2012, p. 2) 
Once again, I am not obsessed with the idea that everything is not 
what it appears to be, that “ghosts” are everywhere looking over our 
shoulders and playing tricks on us. In other words, we should not conclude 
that the whole upheaval was a manipulation of the West or foreign forces 
because, in this case, we will prove further that we are weak and not masters 
of our own will and destiny, and we will end up being puppets in the hands 
of those “dark forces.”  
 At the same time, we should be very careful with the schemes/plots 
of our adversaries/enemies. This is quite fair! Each one is defending its 
territory; it is a question of good sense. It would be naïve for us to think that 
Israel for example is not doing everything in its power to “hack” our 
governments, economies… so as to carry preemptive attacks. It has done so 
ruthlessly since its foundation in 1948...67 What we should do first is to look 
for the enemy within, that sixth battalion that keeps stabbing us in the back 
only to discover, through WikiLeaks for example, that it is nobody else but 
your country’s leader, your next door neighbor, or worse of it all, your own 
brother or sister…68 
 
Conclusion 
 It is never easy to draw conclusions about a movement still in its 
nascent phase, nor is it safe to state that these or those are the causes of an 
uprising or revolt taking place somewhere. The combination of very complex 
circumstances and “luck” are always there to explain why a rebellion turned 
into a revolt and did not go further, while another “insignificant” event 
turned into a full-fledged revolution or a major historic event. It is 
nonetheless always easier to delve into a lengthy explanation and analysis 
                                                          
67
 The only aspect not so “natural” about it is the double standards the Western world holds, 
mainly the US, when it comes to condemn its thug-like assassinations and infiltrations into 
the territories of sovereign states. 
68
 I do believe that, among all the threats facing the Arab-Muslim world, this “enemy 
within” is definitely the worst… I intend to develop this idea in my future writings, and hope 
it will become an axis of research for Arab-Muslim intelligentsia. 
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once an uprising starts. This is probably why it is extremely rare to find 
pundits who could have predicted the fall of the communist bloc, the 9/11 
attacks, or the Arab uprising. 
 We should also be wary of overly generalizing interpretations that 
seek to describe the upheavals of 2011 as the product of a unified wave of 
insurrections. Aside from the domino effect caused by the fall of the Tunisian 
dictator, Z. Ben Ali, the trajectory and the shape taken by the different Arab 
uprisings are all very different. Each country has developed and learned 
differently, too. The Algerian people for example learned the lesson earlier, 
and have preferred to be under the throes of a military junta that is upholding 
a very sick president that “reigns but not rules” rather than re-experiment the 
terrible years of the 1990s. Thus, and apart from the “Kabils” in the north, 
and the Touaregs in the South, few in Algeria have been enthusiastic all 
along these years of protests about taking part in them, refraining from 
emulating other people in other Arab neighbouring countries. They still had 
in mind “the dirty war/la sale guerre” when Algeria went through the 
bloodiest civil war the country had ever known.69 
 The time has come for each one of us to take his/her responsibility, to 
stop looking for scapegoats and blaming the West for our failures. I can say, 
however, that there are two major beneficiaries of what has become now “the 
Arab Winter.” The first is certainly the State of Israel which, with a 
“minimum” effort and manipulation, has managed to marginalize quite 
dramatically the Palestinian cause and the pan-Arabism movement, enjoying 
the show, like Nero with Rome, of an Arab world set ablaze, and making the 
dream of the Arab-Muslim unity a far-fetched dream. This is the dark side of 
the movement; the bright side is certainly the new Arab citizen who seems to 
have overcome definitely the fear factor and does no more hesitate to stand 
for his/her rights. 
 One final positive note to end this essay: Tarek Ramadan’s 
recommendation in his book Islam and the Arab Awakening:  
Arab and Muslim majority societies must jettison their historic 
posture as victims and reconcile themselves with the course of 
history that millions of women and men accelerated so 
massively by coming out into the streets. Their responsibility is 
a historic one: they must entertain no illusions about what is at 
stake, be wary of attempts at manipulation, and be determined 
to carry out essential reforms with the full participation of all 
citizens, women and men, from all social classes and religious 
and cultural backgrounds. (Ramadan, 2012, p. 3) 
                                                          
69
 For further information about the Algerian civil war, see: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_Civil_War 
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